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Abstract
In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the
α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and
concave (Zhao 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (1997), we assume that
firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We
deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two
different approaches. The first establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly
TU(Transferable Utility)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is dif-
ferentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the
set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result
for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot
oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation
rule in the γ-core called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value. This result generalizes Funaki
and Yamato’s core existence result (1999) from no capacity constraint to asym-
metric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of
this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity and
non-cooperative fairness.
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly TU-games; γ-core; Balanced game; NP-value; Non-
cooperative fairness
1 Introduction
Usually, oligopoly situations1 are modeled by means of non-cooperative games. Every
profit-maximizing firm pursues Nash strategies and the resulting outcome is not Pareto
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optimal. Yet, it is known that firms are better off by forming cartels and that Pareto
efficiency is achieved when all the firms merge together. A problem faced by the members
of a cartel is the stability of the agreement and non-cooperative game theory predicts that
member firms have always an incentive to deviate from the agreed-upon output decision.
However, in some oligopoly situations firms don’t always behave non-cooperatively
and if sufficient communication is feasible it may be possible for firms to sign agreements.
A question is then whether it is possible for firms to agree all together and coordinate
their output decision to achieve Pareto efficiency. For that, we consider a fully cooper-
ative approach for oligopoly situations without transferable technologies, i.e. cartel-wide
production technology is determined by all member firms and not by the most efficient
firm in the cartel. For studying properties of cooperative oligopoly games, we convert the
associated normal form oligopoly game into an oligopoly TU-game in which firms can
form cartels acting as a single player. Since the inverse demand function depends on the
total output, the output decision of a cartel as well as its income depend on outsiders’
behavior. Hence, the determination of the income that a cartel can obtain requires to
specify how firms outside react. Aumann (1959) proposes two approaches: according to
the first, every cartel computes the total profit which it can guarantee itself regardless
of what outsiders do; the second approach consists in computing the minimal profit for
which outsiders can prevent the players in the cartel from getting more. With or without
transferable technologies, Zhao (1999a,b) shows that these two approaches lead to the
same oligopoly TU-game by proving that the associated characteristic functions, called
α- and β-characteristic functions respectively, are equal.
In oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies, Zhao (1999a) provides a nec-
essary and sufficient condition to establish the convexity property in case the inverse
demand function and cost functions are linear. Although these games may fail to be
convex in general, Norde et al. (2002) show they are nevertheless totally balanced. Con-
cerning oligopoly TU-games without transferable technologies, Zhao (1999b) proves that
the β-core is non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave.2
Furthermore, Norde et al. (2002) show that these games are convex in case the inverse
demand function and cost functions are linear, and Driessen and Meinhardt (2005) pro-
vide economically meaningful sufficient conditions to guarantee the convexity property in
a more general case.
All these articles share the assumption that outsiders minimize the income of a de-
viating coalition (α- and β-characteristic functions). However, this assumption can be
questioned since outsiders probably cause substantial damages upon themselves by in-
creasing their output at full capacity. A similar argument is developed by Rosenthal
(1971). We propose to consider an alternative blocking rule suggested by Chander and
Tulkens (1997) where external agents choose their action individually as a best reply to
the coalitional action. This leads to consider the "partial agreement characteristic func-
tion" or, for short, γ-characteristic function. These authors analyse a game in coalitional
2Zhao shows that the β-core is non-empty for general TU-games in which every strategy set is compact
and convex, every utility function is continuous and concave, and satisfying the strong separability
condition that requires that the payoff function of a coalition and each of its members’ utility functions
have the same minimizers. Zhao proves that oligopoly TU-games satisfy this latter condition.
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form derived from an economy with environmental externalities and exhibit a strategy, the
ratio equilibrium (Kaneko 1977), for which the resulting outcome belongs to the γ-core
for linear utility functions. Helm (2001) generalizes their result by showing that the bal-
ancedness condition is satisfied when every individual utility function is differentiable and
concave. Funaki and Yamato (1999) study an economy with a common pool resource
that also describes an oligopoly situation and show that the associated cooperative game
admits a non-empty γ-core in case firms have symmetric and linear cost functions and
no capacity constraint.
In this paper we focus on oligopoly TU-games without transferable technologies. Our
main objective is to deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the γ-core for the
class of oligopoly TU-games. In order to do that, we first show that oligopoly TU-games
in γ-characteristic function form are well-defined and study some of their properties con-
cerning equilibrium outputs. We go step further by adopting a more general approach
in which we assume that any coalition structure can occur. In particular, the coalition
structures in which every coalition faces outsiders acting individually can form. For every
coalition structure, we construct a normal form oligopoly game for which a Nash equi-
librium represents the aggregated equilibrium outputs of the embedded coalitions. Our
first result proves that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for every coalition structure.
This permits to conclude that oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form are
well-defined. Our second result shows that the equilibrium total production is decreasing
with the coarseness of the coalition structure. This feature follows from two phenomena.
Firstly, when some coalitions merge, the production of the new entity decreases, and
secondly, the other coalitions respond by increasing their outputs.
Then, by using these preliminaries results we study the non-emptiness of the γ-core. We
consider two approaches. The first shows that if the inverse demand function is differ-
entiable and if every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of
strategy profiles, the corresponding oligopoly TU-game is balanced, and therefore has
a non-empty γ-core. This result extends Zhao’s core existence result (1999b) for the
class of oligopoly TU-games since the γ-core is included in the β-core and the α-core.
A drawback with this approach is that it does not point out any allocation rule belong-
ing to the γ-core. The second approach provides a new single-valued allocation rule in
the γ-core, called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value, on the class of oligopoly TU-games with
linear cost functions and asymmetric capacity constraints. The NP-value distributes to
every player the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to his Nash individual out-
put. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s core existence result (1999) from no
capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints insofar as our oligopoly game also
describes a common pool game (Moulin and Watts 1997). We characterize this solu-
tion by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity and non-cooperative
fairness. Efficiency requires that a solution distributes the worth of the grand coalition
among players. The null firm property stipulates that a firm with no production capacity
obtains a zero payoff. Monotonicity specifies that if a firm has a production capacity
greater than or equal to the production capacity of another firm, then former’s payoff
will be greater than or equal to latter’s payoff. Non-cooperative fairness requires that a
solution distributes to every player a payoff proportionally to his individual profit in the
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finest coalition structure. As far as we know, this is the first result that characterizes a
solution belonging to a core for a particular class of oligopoly TU-games. Furthermore,
we provide an example in which the oligopoly TU-game in γ-characteristic function form,
where the inverse demand function and cost functions are linear, fails to be superadditive,
and so convex. This proves that Norde et al.’s result (2002) can not be extended for
oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the
model and some notations. Section 3 presents some properties of oligopoly TU-games in
γ-characteristic function. Section 4 establishes our first main result: oligopoly TU-games
in γ-characteristic function are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable
and if every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strat-
egy profiles. Section 5 provides a solution in the γ-core, the NP-value, for the class
of oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions and asymmetric capacity constraints.
Furthermore, we propose an axiomatic characterization of this solution. Section 6 gives
some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider an oligopoly situation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set
of firms where i is a representative element, wi ≥ 0 denote firm i’s capacity constraint,
Ci : R+ −→ R+, i ∈ N , is firm i’s cost function and p : R+ −→ R+ represents the
inverse demand function. Throughout this paper, we assume that:
(a) the inverse demand function p is differentiable, strictly decreasing and concave;
(b) every cost function Ci is continuous, strictly increasing and convex.
The normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) associated with the oligopoly situ-
ation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) is defined as follows:
1. the set of firms is N = {1, 2, . . . , n};
2. for every i ∈ N , the individual strategy set is Xi = [0, wi] ⊂ R+ where xi ∈ Xi
represents the quantity produced by firm i;
3. the set of strategy profiles is XN =
∏
i∈N Xi where x = (xi)i∈N is a rep-
resentative element of XN ; for every i ∈ N , the individual profit function
πi : XN −→ R+ is defined as
πi(x) = p(X)xi − Ci(xi) (1)
where X =
∑
i∈N xi is the joint production.
Note that firm i’s profit depends on its individual output xi and on the total output of
its opponents
∑
j∈N\{i} xj .
As mentioned above, we want to analyze the stability of cartels and the incentive for
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merger in oligopoly situations. To this end, we convert the normal form oligopoly game
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) into an oligopoly TU-game. Let P(N) be the power set of N and call
a subset S ∈ P(N), S 6= ∅, a coalition. In a general framework, a TU-game (N, v) is
a set function v : P(N) −→ R with the convention v(∅) = 0, which assigns a number
v(S) ∈ R to every coalition S ∈ P(N). This number v(S) is the worth of coalition
S. For a fixed set of players N , we denote by GN the set of TU-games where v is a
representative element of GN .
In a TU-game v ∈ GN , every player i ∈ N may receive a payoff σi ∈ R. A vector
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a payoff vector. We say that a payoff vector σ ∈ R
n is acceptable
if
∑
i∈S σi ≥ v(S) for every coalition S ∈ P(N), i.e. the payoff vector provides a total
payoff to members of coalition S that is at least as great as its worth. We say that a
payoff vector σ ∈ Rn is efficient if
∑
i∈N σi = v(N), i.e. the payoff vector provides a
total payoff to all players that is equal to the worth of the grand coalition N . The core
C(v) of a TU-game v ∈ GN is the set of all payoff vectors that are both acceptable and
efficient, i.e.
C(v) =
{
σ ∈ Rn : ∀S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
σi ≥ v(S) and
∑
i∈N
σi = v(N)
}
(2)
Given a payoff vector in the core, the grand coalition could form and distribute its worth
as payoffs to its members in such a way that no coalition can contest this sharing by
breaking off from the grand coalition.
There are two main ways of converting a normal form game into a cooperative game
called game in α- and β-characteristic function form respectively (Aumann 1959): in the
first case, the worth of a coalition is obtained by computing the profit which its members
can guarantee themselves regardless of what outsiders do; in the second case, the worth
of a coalition can be derived by computing the minimal profit such that outsiders can
prevent its members from getting more. In order to define the α- and β-characteristic
functions, we denote by XS =
∏
i∈S Xi the strategy set of coalition S ∈ P(N) and
X−S =
∏
i 6∈S Xi the set of outsiders’ strategy profiles for which xS = (xi)i∈S and
x−S = (xi)i 6∈S are the representative elements respectively. Given the normal form
oligopoly TU-game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ), these functions are defined for every coalition S ∈
P(N) as
vα(S) = max
xS∈XS
min
z−S∈X−S
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z−S) (3)
and
vβ(S) = min
z−S∈X−S
max
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z−S) (4)
respectively.3 Since the inverse demand function p is strictly decreasing with the joint
production X, we deduce from (1) that
3At this step, we assume that these maximization/minimization problems have optimal solutions.
This remark will remain valid for the γ-characteristic function.
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∀xS ∈ XS , w−S = (wi)i 6∈S ∈ arg min
z−S∈X−S
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z−S) (5)
where wi ∈ Xi is the full capacity output of firm i. Furthermore, for every S ∈ P(N),
define BS : X−S ։ XS the best reply correspondence of coalition S as
∀z−S ∈ X−S , BS(z−S) = arg max
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z−S) (6)
For notational convenience, we denote by x∗S(z−S) a representative element of BS(z−S).
Zhao (1999b) shows that the α- and β-characteristic functions are equal for the class of
oligopoly TU-games. This result, (4), (5) and (6) together imply
vα(S) = vβ(S) =
∑
i∈S
πi(x
∗
S(w−S), w−S) (7)
By assuming that every individual profit function πi is concave on the set of strategy
profiles, the non-emptiness of the α- and β-cores follows from Zhao’s theorem (1999b).
The resorting to the α- and β-characteristic functions to construct oligopoly TU-
games can be questioned insofar as the reaction of external firms to minimize the worth of
a deviating coalition by increasing their output at full capacity probably implies substantial
damages upon themselves. As in Chander and Tulkens (1997), we consider the alternative
blocking rule for which outsiders choose their strategy individually as a best reply facing
the deviating coalition. This leads to consider the γ-characteristic function. In order to
define the γ-characteristic function, for every deviating coalition S ∈ P(N) and for any
xS ∈ XS , we denote by z˜−S(xS) = (z˜i(xS , z˜−S∪i))i 6∈S ∈
∏
i 6∈S Bi(xS , z˜−S∪i) outsiders’
individual best reply strategy profile where S ∪ i stands for S ∪{i}. Given the normal
form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ), the γ-characteristic function is defined for every
coalition S ∈ P(N) as
vγ(S) =
∑
i∈S
πi(x
∗
S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S)) (8)
The strategy profile (x∗S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S)) ∈ XN is called a partial agreement equilib-
rium under S. For a fixed set of players N , we denote by GNo ⊆ G
N the set of oligopoly
TU-games. The following proposition shows that the γ-core is included in the β-core,
and therefore by (7) in the α-core.
Proposition 2.1 Let vγ ∈ G
N
o and vβ ∈ G
N
o be oligopoly TU-games associated with
the oligopoly situation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p). Then
C(vγ) ⊆ C(vβ) (9)
Proof: By (2), we have to show that vγ(S) ≥ vβ(S) for every S ∈ P(N)\{N} and
vγ(N) = vβ(N). Clearly,
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vγ(N) = max
x∈XN
∑
i∈N
πi(x)
= vβ(N).
Moreover, for every S ∈ P(N)\{N}, it holds that
vγ(S) =
∑
i∈S
πi(x
∗
S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S))
= max
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z˜−S(x
∗
S))
≥ max
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , w−S)
= min
z−S∈X−S
max
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
πi(xS , z−S)
= vβ(S)
where the inequality and the third equality follow from (5). 
3 Properties of Cournot oligopoly TU-games
In this section, we study the existence of partial agreement equilibria for every normal
form oligopoly game. This will permit us to make sure that the associated oligopoly TU-
game in γ-characteristic function form as in (8) is well-defined, i.e. there exists a unique
worth, vγ(S), for every coalition S ∈ P(N). Moreover, for every S, T ∈ P(N) such
that S ⊆ T , we analyse the variations in equilibrium outputs from a partial agreement
equilibrium under S to a partial agreement equilibrium under T . To this end, we adopt
a more general approach in which we assume that any coalition structure can occur. For
every normal form oligopoly game and any coalition structure, we construct an associated
normal form oligopoly game for which a Nash equilibrium represents the aggregated
equilibrium outputs of the coalitions embedded in the coalition structure.
A coalition structure P is a partition of the set of firms N , i.e. P = {S1, . . . , Sk},
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. An element of a coalition structure, S ∈ P, is called an admissible
coalition in P. We denote by Π(N) the set of coalition structures.
Given the normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) and the coalition structure P ∈
Π(N), we say that a strategy profile xˆ ∈ XN is an equilibrium under P if
∀S ∈ P, xˆS ∈ BS(xˆ−S) (10)
where BS is the best reply correspondence given by (6). Thus, a partial agreement
equilibrium under S ∈ P(N) corresponds to an equilibrium under the particular coalition
structure denoted by PS = {S} ∪ {{i} : i 6∈ S}.
7
For every normal form oligopoly game, we deal with the problem of the existence of an
equilibrium under every coalition structure. To this end, given a normal form oligopoly
game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) and a coalition structure P ∈ Π(N), we define the normal form
oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P) as follows:
1. the set of players (or admissible coalitions) is P;
2. for every S ∈ P , the coalition strategy set is XS = [0, wS ] ⊂ R+, w
S =∑
i∈S wi, for which x
S =
∑
i∈S xi ∈ X
S is a representative element that represents
the quantity produced by coalition S;
3. the set of strategy profiles is XP =
∏
S∈P X
S for which xP = (xS)S∈P is a
representative element; for every S ∈ P, the coalition cost function CS : X
S −→
R+ is defined as
CS(x
S) = min
xS∈I(xS)
∑
i∈S
Ci(xi) (11)
where I(xS) = {xS ∈ XS :
∑
i∈S xi = x
S} is the set of strategies of coalition S
that permit it to produce the quantity xS ; for every S ∈ P , the coalition profit
function πS : X
P −→ R is defined as
πS(x
P) = p(X)xS − CS(x
S) (12)
In order to define the best reply correspondence of the players (the admissible coalitions),
for every S ∈ P, we denote by X−S = XP\{S} the set of outsiders’ strategy profiles
for which x−S = xP\{S} is a representative element. For every S ∈ P, define BS :
X−S ։ XS the best reply correspondence of coalition S as
∀z−S ∈ X−S , BS(z−S) = arg max
xS∈XS
πS(x
S , z−S) (13)
Given the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P), we say that a strategy profile
xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium if
∀S ∈ P, xˆS ∈ BS(xˆ−S) (14)
where BS is the best reply correspondence given by (13).
The following proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium under every coalition
structure P ∈ Π(N).
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) be a normal form oligopoly game. Then, for any
coalition structure P ∈ Π(N), there exists an equilibrium under P.
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Proof: Consider the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P) associated with the
normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) and the coalition structure P ∈ Π(N). We
proceed in two parts.
First, we show that there exists a strategy profile xˆP ∈ XP that is a Nash equilibrium
for the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P) if and only if there exists a strat-
egy profile xˆ ∈ XN that is an equilibrium under P for the normal form oligopoly game
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) where xˆS ∈ I(xˆ
S) for every S ∈ P.
[=⇒]: let xˆP ∈ XP be a Nash equilibrium for the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P).
By (11), for every S ∈ P there exists xˆS ∈ XS such that∑
i∈S
xˆi = xˆ
S and
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi) = CS(xˆ
S) (15)
For the sake of contradiction assume that the strategy profile xˆ = (xˆS)S∈P ∈ XN as in
(15) is not an equilibrium under P for the normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ).
It follows that xˆS 6∈ BS(xˆ−S) for some S ∈ P, i.e. there exists xˇS ∈ XS such that∑
i∈S
πi(xˆS , xˆ−S) <
∑
i∈S
πi(xˇS , xˆ−S) (16)
In the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P), we denote by xˇ
S ∈ XS the cor-
responding strategy of coalition S such that xˇS =
∑
i∈S xˇi. By (15), (16) and (11), it
holds that
πS(xˆ
P) = p(Xˆ)xˆS − CS(xˆ
S)
= p(Xˆ)
∑
i∈S
xˆi −
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi)
=
∑
i∈S
πi(xˆS , xˆ−S)
<
∑
i∈S
πi(xˇS , xˆ−S)
= p
(∑
i∈S
xˇi +
∑
i 6∈S
xˆi
)∑
i∈S
xˇi −
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˇi)
≤ p(xˇS + Xˆ − xˆS)xˇS − CS(xˇ
S)
= πS(xˇ
S , xˆ−S),
a contradiction with xˆS ∈ BS(xˆ−S) for every S ∈ P.
[⇐=]: let xˆ ∈ XN be an equilibrium under P for the normal form oligopoly game
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ). For the associated normal form oligopoly game (P, (X
S , πS)S∈P), we
define the strategy profile xˆP ∈ XP such that
∀S ∈ P, xˆS =
∑
i∈S
xˆi (17)
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From the fact that xˆS ∈ I(xˆ
S) and xˆS ∈ BS(xˆ−S) we deduce that
∑
i∈S Ci(xˆi) =
CS(xˆ
S) for every S ∈ P. For the sake of contradiction assume that the strategy profile
xˆP = (xˆS)S∈P ∈ X
P as in (17) is not a Nash equilibrium for the normal form oligopoly
game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P). It follows that xˆ
S 6∈ BS(xˆ−S) for some S ∈ P, i.e. there exists
xˇS ∈ XS such that
πS(xˆ
S , xˆ−S) < πS(xˇ
S , xˆ−S) (18)
By (11), we know that there exists xˇS ∈ XS such that∑
i∈S
xˇi = xˇ
S and
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˇi) = CS(xˇ
S) (19)
By (18) and (19), it holds that
∑
i∈S
πi(xˆ) = p(Xˆ)
∑
i∈S
xˆi −
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi)
= p(Xˆ)xˆS − CS(xˆ
S)
= πS(xˆ
S , xˆ−S)
< πS(xˇ
S , xˆ−S)
= p(xˇS + Xˆ − xˆS)xˇS − CS(xˇ
S)
= p
(∑
i∈S
xˇi +
∑
i 6∈S
xˆi
)∑
i∈S
xˇi −
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˇi)
=
∑
i∈S
πi(xˇS , xˆ−S),
a contradiction with xˆS ∈ BS(xˆ−S) for every S ∈ P.
Then, we show that the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P) admits a unique
Nash equilibrium. For every S ∈ P , XS is compact and convex and CS as in (11) is
continuous, strictly increasing and convex.4 Moreover, the inverse demand function p
is differentiable, strictly decreasing and concave. It follows from theorem 3.3.3 (page
30) in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990) that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for
the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P). From the first part of the proof, we
conclude that there exists an equilibrium under P for the normal form oligopoly game
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ). 
Given the normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ), we saw that a partial agreement
equilibrium under S corresponds to an equilibrium under PS = {S} ∪ {{i} : i 6∈ S}.
Hence, we deduce from proposition 3.1 the following corollary.
4The properties of the coalition cost function CS follow from the continuity, the strict monotonicity
and the convexity of every cost function Ci.
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Corollary 3.2 Let (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) be a normal form oligopoly game. Then, for every
S ∈ P(N) it holds that
(i) there exists a partial agreement equilibrium under S.
(ii) for any two partial agreement equilibria (x∗S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S)), (y
∗
S(t˜−S), t˜−S(y
∗
S)) ∈
XN , it holds that
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S) =
∑
i∈S
y∗S,i(t˜−S) and
∑
i∈S
Ci(x
∗
S,i(z˜−S)) =
∑
i∈S
Ci(y
∗
S,i(t˜−S)).
Point (i) is a direct consequence of proposition 3.1. Point (ii) follows from the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium in the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P). This stems
from the fact that members of S can reallocate the total production among themselves.
By (8), this implies that the worth of a coalition S ∈ P(N), vγ(S), is unique.
5
The following example shows that the continuity of the inverse demand function is not
a sufficient condition to guarantee the uniqueness of the worth, vγ(S), of every coalition
S ∈ P(N). This explains why we assumed the differentiability of the inverse demand
function.
Example 3.3
Consider the oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N
o associated with the oligopoly situation
6
(N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) where N = {1, 2, 3}, w1 = 2, w2 = 1, w3 = 2, C1(x1) = 97x1,
C2(x2) = 98x2, C3(x3) = 98x3, and the inverse demand function is defined as
p(X) =
{
103−X if 0 ≤ X ≤ 3
50(5−X) if 3 < X ≤ 5
Clearly, p is continuous, piecewise linear and concave but it is not differentiable. Assume
that coalition {2, 3} forms. We show that every strategy profile x ∈ XN such that (i)
X = 3 and (ii) x2 + x3 ∈ [1/25, 2] is a partial agreement equilibrium under {2, 3}. By
(i) we have
π1(x) = 3x1
and
π2(x) + π3(x) = 2(x2 + x3).
5Point (ii) of corollary 3.2 remains valid for any coalition structure P ∈ Π(N), i.e. for any two
equilibria under P, xˆ, xˇ ∈ XN , it holds that
∀S ∈ P, xˆS = xˇS and
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi) =
∑
i∈S
Ci(xˇi).
6This oligopoly situation is taken from Norde et al. (2002).
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If player 1 increases his output by ǫ ∈ ]0, 2− x1], his new payoff will be
π1(x1 + ǫ, x2, x3) = (3− 50ǫ)(x1 + ǫ) (20)
Conversely, if he decides to decrease his output by δ ∈ ]0, x1], he will obtain
π1(x1 − δ, x2, x3) = (3 + δ)(x1 − δ) (21)
Similarly, if coalition {2, 3} increases its output by ǫ + ǫ′ ∈ ]0, 3− x2 − x3] where ǫ ∈
[0, 1− x2] and ǫ
′ ∈ [0, 2− x3], its new payoff will be
3∑
i=2
πi(x1, x2 + ǫ, x3 + ǫ
′) =
(
2− 50(ǫ+ ǫ′)
)
(x2 + x3 + ǫ+ ǫ
′) (22)
On the contrary, if it decreases its output by δ + δ′ ∈ ]0, x2 + x3] with δ ∈ [0, x2] and
δ′ ∈ [0, x3], it will obtain
3∑
i=2
πi(x1, x2 − δ, x3 − δ
′) = (2 + δ + δ′)(x2 + x3 − δ − δ
′) (23)
In all cases (20), (21) (22) and (23), given (ii), neither player 1 nor coalition {2, 3} can
improve their payoff. We conclude that every strategy profile x ∈ XN satisfying (i) and
(ii) is a partial agreement equilibrium under {2, 3}. Thus, the worth of coalition {2, 3}
belongs to [2/25, 4], so it is not unique. 
Now, for every normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) and every coalition S ∈
P(N), we study the variations of equilibrium outputs of S according to the coarseness
of the coalition structure in which it is embedded. To this end, we introduce a binary
relation ≤F on Π(N) defined as follows: we say that a coalition structure P ∈ Π(N)
is finer than a coalition structure P ′ ∈ Π(N) (or P ′ is coarser than P) which we write
P ′ ≤F P if for every admissible coalition S in P there exists an admissible coalition T in
P ′ such that T ⊇ S. Note that (Π(N),≤F ) is a complete lattice.
Given the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P), in order to define some
properties of the best reply correspondence BS given by (13) of every coalition S ∈ P,
we introduce the notions of forward and backward divided differences. For any function
f : R+ −→ R and all ǫ > 0, define the forward and backward divided differences
f+ : R+ × R+ −→ R and f
− : R+ × R+ −→ R as
f+(a, ǫ) =
1
ǫ
(f(a+ ǫ)− f(a))
and
f−(a, ǫ) =
1
ǫ
(f(a)− f(a− ǫ)).
For every admissible coalition S in P and all ǫ > 0, define the functions ϕ+S : X
S ×
X−S × R+ −→ R and ϕ
−
S : X
S ×X−S × R+ −→ R as
12
ϕ+S (x
S , x−S , ǫ) = p(X + ǫ) + xSp+(X, ǫ)− C+S (x
S , ǫ)
and
ϕ−S (x
S , x−S , ǫ) = p(X − ǫ) + xSp−(X, ǫ)− C−S (x
S , ǫ).
We see that an admissible coalition S ∈ P can’t benefit from increasing its output by ǫ
if and only if ϕ+S (x
S , x−S , ǫ) ≤ 0; it can’t benefit from decreasing its output by ǫ if and
only if ϕ−S (x
S , x−S , ǫ) ≥ 0. Thus, the best reply correspondence BS of every admissible
coalition S ∈ P given by (13) has the three following properties:
1. 0 ∈ BS(x−S)⇐⇒ ϕ+S (0, x
−S , ǫ) ≤ 0, ∀ǫ > 0;
2. wS ∈ BS(x−S)⇐⇒ ϕ−S (w
S , x−S , ǫ) ≥ 0, ∀ǫ > 0;
3. xS ∈ BS(x−S) : xS ∈ ]0, wS [ ⇐⇒ ϕ−S (x
S , x−S , ǫ) ≥ 0 ≥ ϕ+S (x
S , x−S , ǫ′),
∀ǫ, ǫ′ > 0.
The following proposition compares equilibria under P and P ′ such that P ′ ≤F P.
Proposition 3.4 Let P,P ′ ∈ Π(N) be two coalition structures such that P ′ ≤F P . Let
xˆP ∈ XP and xˇP
′
∈ XP
′
be the Nash equilibria of the normal form oligopoly games
(P, (XS , πS)S∈P) and (P
′, (XS , πS)S∈P ′) respectively. Then, it holds that
(i) Xˇ ≤ Xˆ
(ii) ∀(S, T ) ∈ P × P ′ such that S ⊆ T , xˆS ≤ xˇT
(iii)
∑
T∈P ′\P xˇ
T ≤
∑
S∈P\P ′ xˆ
S
In order to establish the proof of proposition 3.4, we first need the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.5 Let P,P ′ ∈ Π(N) be two coalition structures for which there exist T ∈ P ′
and Sl ∈ P, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that T =
⋃p
l=1 Sl. Let xˆ
P ∈ XP and
xˇP
′
∈ XP
′
be the Nash equilibria of the normal form oligopoly games (P, (XS , πS)S∈P)
and (P ′, (XS , πS)S∈P ′) respectively. If Xˆ ≤ Xˇ then it holds that xˇ
T ≤
∑p
l=1 xˆ
Sl .
Proof: Let P,P ′ ∈ Π(N) be two coalition structures satisfying the conditions of lemma
3.5. For all l ∈ {1, . . . , p} denote by xˇSl the output of subset Sl in coalition T so
that
∑p
l=1 xˇ
Sl = xˇT . By the definition of a Nash equilibrium, for all ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 and all
l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, it holds that
ϕ+Sl(xˆ
Sl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ) ≤ 0
and
p(Xˇ − ǫ′) + xˇT p−(Xˇ, ǫ′)− C−Sl(xˇ
Sl , ǫ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aǫ
′
l
≥ 0
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where the second inequality means that, under the Nash equilibrium xˇP
′
∈ XP
′
, neither
coalition T nor any of its subset Sl, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, can benefit from decreasing their
output. For all ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 and every l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, define Qlǫ,ǫ′ = ϕ
+
Sl
(xˆSl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ)−Aǫ
′
l ≤
0. For the sake of contradiction assume that there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that
xˇSl > xˆSl . We have
Qlǫ,ǫ′ = p(Xˆ + ǫ)− p(Xˇ − ǫ
′)
+ xˆSlp+(Xˆ, ǫ)− xˇT p−(Xˇ, ǫ′)
+ C−Sl(xˇ
Sl , ǫ′)− C+Sl(xˆ
Sl , ǫ).
In order to obtain a contradiction, it is sufficient to show that Qlǫ,ǫ′ is positive for small
enough ǫ and ǫ′ = ǫ. First, take ǫ = ǫ′ and ǫ < xˇSl − xˆSl . By the convexity of cost
functions and the definitions of C+Sl and C
−
Sl
, it holds that
C+Sl(xˆ
Sl , ǫ) ≤ C+Sl(xˇ
Sl − ǫ, ǫ)
= C−Sl(xˇ
Sl , ǫ′)
(24)
By (24) and the differentiability of the inverse demand function p it follows that
lim
ǫ−→0
Qlǫ,ǫ ≥ p(Xˆ)− p(Xˇ) + xˆ
Slp′(Xˆ)− xˇT p′(Xˇ)
> 0
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that the inverse demand function p is
strictly decreasing and concave and from the assumption xˆSl < xˇSl ≤ xˇT . Hence, we
obtain a contradiction with Qlǫ,ǫ′ = ϕ
+
Sl
(xˆSl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ) − Aǫ
′
l ≤ 0 for all ǫ, ǫ
′ > 0. So, for
all l ∈ {1, . . . , p} we have xˇSl ≤ xˆSl which implies xˇT =
∑p
l=1 xˇ
Sl ≤
∑p
l=1 xˆ
Sl . 
Lemma 3.6 Let P,P ′ ∈ Π(N) be two coalition structures for which there exist T ∈ P ′
and Sl ∈ P, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that T =
⋃p
l=1 Sl. Let xˆ
P ∈ XP and
xˇP
′
∈ XP
′
be the Nash equilibria of the normal form oligopoly games (P, (XS , πS)S∈P)
and (P ′, (XS , πS)S∈P ′) respectively. If Xˇ ≤ Xˆ then it holds that xˇ
T ≥ xˆSl for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
Proof: Let P,P ′ ∈ Π(N) be two coalition structures satisfying the conditions of lemma
3.6. By the definition of a Nash equilibrium, for all ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 and all l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, it
holds that ϕ+T (xˇ
T , xˇ−T , ǫ) ≤ 0 and ϕ−Sl(xˆ
Sl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ′) ≥ 0. For all ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 and every
l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, define Qlǫ,ǫ′ = ϕ
+
T (xˇ
T , xˇ−T , ǫ) − ϕ−Sl(xˆ
Sl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ′) ≤ 0. For the sake of
contradiction assume that there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that xˆSl > xˇT . We have
Qlǫ,ǫ′ = p(Xˇ + ǫ)− p(Xˆ − ǫ
′)
+ xˇT p+(Xˇ, ǫ)− xˆSlp−(Xˆ, ǫ′)
+ C−Sl(xˆ
Sl , ǫ′)− C+T (xˇ
T , ǫ).
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As in the previous lemma, it is sufficient to show that Qlǫ,ǫ′ is positive for small enough ǫ
and ǫ′ = ǫ. First, take ǫ = ǫ′ and ǫ < xˆSl − xˇT . By the convexity of cost functions, the
definitions of C+T , C
+
Sl
and C−Sl , and from the fact that it is less costly for coalition T to
redistribute an extra cost than for any of its subsets Sl, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, it holds that
C+T (xˇ
T , ǫ) ≤ C+T (xˆ
Sl − ǫ, ǫ)
≤ C+Sl(xˆ
Sl − ǫ, ǫ)
= C−Sl(xˆ
Sl , ǫ′)
(25)
By (25) and the differentiability of the inverse demand function p it follows that
lim
ǫ−→0
Qlǫ,ǫ ≥ p(Xˇ)− p(Xˆ) + xˇ
T p′(Xˇ)− xˆSlp′(Xˆ)
> 0
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that the inverse demand function p is
strictly decreasing and concave and from the assumption xˆSl > xˇT . Hence, we obtain a
contradiction with Qlǫ,ǫ′ = ϕ
+
T (xˇ
T , xˇ−T , ǫ) − ϕ−Sl(xˆ
Sl , xˆ−Sl , ǫ′) ≤ 0 for all ǫ, ǫ′ > 0. So,
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , p} we have xˇT ≥ xˆSl . 
Now, we are ready to establish the proof of proposition 3.4.
Proof: First, in order to prove (i), assume by contradiction that Xˆ < Xˇ. Since P ′ ≤F
P, for every T ∈ P ′ there exists Sl ∈ P , l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, p ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that
T =
⋃p
l=1 Sl. It follows from lemma 3.5 that for every T ∈ P
′ and every Sl ∈ P,
l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, we have xˇT ≤
∑p
l=1 xˆ
Sl , and so Xˇ ≤ Xˆ a contradiction.
Then, point (ii) follows directly from (i) and lemma 3.6.
Finally, point (iii) is a consequence of points (i) and (ii). Indeed, by (i) it holds that
Xˇ ≤ Xˆ ⇐⇒
∑
T∈P ′
xˇT ≤
∑
S∈P
xˆS
⇐⇒
∑
T∈P ′\P
xˇT +
∑
T∈P ′∩P
xˇT ≤
∑
S∈P\P ′
xˆS +
∑
S∈P∩P ′
xˆS
⇐⇒
∑
T∈P ′∩P
xˇT −
∑
S∈P∩P ′
xˆS ≤
∑
S∈P\P ′
xˆS −
∑
T∈P ′\P
xˇT
(26)
Moreover, by (ii) it follows that∑
T∈P ′∩P
xˇT −
∑
S∈P∩P ′
xˆS ≥ 0 (27)
Combining (26) and (27) we obtain
∑
T∈P ′\P xˇ
T ≤
∑
S∈P\P ′ xˆ
S . 
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Point (iii) of proposition 3.4 can not be improved in the sense that it does not always
hold that for every T ∈ P ′ and every Sl ∈ P, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, such that T =
⋃p
l=1 Sl, we
have xˇT ≤
∑p
l=1 xˆ
Sl . This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.7
Consider the oligopoly situation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) where N = {1, . . . , 8}, wi = 3/2 and
Ci(xi) = xi for all i ∈ N , and the inverse demand function is defined as p(X) = 12−X.
Let P = {{i} : i ∈ N},P ′ = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8}} ∈ Π(N) be two coalition struc-
tures such that P ′ ≤F P. The Nash equilibria of the normal form oligopoly games
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) and (P
′, (XS , πS)S∈P ′) are given by z˜i(z˜−i)
7= 11/9 for all i ∈ N
and by xˇP
′
= (11/4, 11/4, 11/4) respectively. So, we have xˇ{1,2} = 11/4 > 22/9 =
z˜1(z˜−1) + z˜2(z˜−2). 
We saw that the Nash equilibrium outputs of the normal form oligopoly game (P, (XS , πS)S∈P)
are equal to the aggregated equilibrium outputs under P of the normal form oligopoly
game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ). For notational convenience, given a normal form oligopoly game
(N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ), a coalition S ∈ P(N), and a partial agreement equilibrium under S,
(x∗S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S)) ∈ XN , where z˜−S(x
∗
S) stands for (z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i))i 6∈S , we denote by
XP,S the total output of the partial agreement equilibrium under S, i.e.
XP,S =
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S) +
∑
i 6∈S
z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i).
For partial agreement equilibria we deduce from proposition 3.4 the following corollary.
Corollary 3.8 Let (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) be a normal form oligopoly game. Then, for every
S, T ∈ P(N) such that S ⊆ T , it holds that
(i) XP,S ≥ XP,T
(ii) ∀i 6∈ T , z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i) ≤ z˜i(x
∗
T , z˜−T∪i)
(iii)
∑
i∈S x
∗
S,i(z˜−S) ≤
∑
i∈T x
∗
T,i(z˜−T )
(iv)
∑
i∈T x
∗
T,i(z˜−T ) ≤
∑
i∈S x
∗
S,i(z˜−S) +
∑
i∈T\S z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i)
Points (ii) and (iii) follow from (ii) of proposition 3.4. Only point (ii) requires a comment:
it stipulates that players outside T increase their output from the partial agreement
equilibrium under S to the partial agreement equilibrium under T .
7Given the normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, pii)i∈N ), we denote by (z˜i(z˜−i))i∈N ∈ XN its
unique Nash equilibrium. For all j ∈ N , we will also use this notation to refer to every partial agreement
equilibrium under P{j} = {{i} : i ∈ N}.
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4 Balancedness of Cournot oligopoly TU-games
In this section, we analyze the non-emptiness of the γ-core. Following the Bondareva-
Shapley theorem (Bondareva 1963, Shapley 1967), balancedness property is a necessary
and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core for every TU-game
v ∈ GN . Let B ⊆ P(N) be a family of coalitions and denote by Bi = {S ∈ B : i ∈ S}
the subset of those coalitions of which player i is a member. Then B is said to be
a balanced family of coalitions if for every S ∈ B there exists a balancing weight
λS ∈ R+ such that
∑
S∈Bi
λS = 1 for every i ∈ N . A TU-game v ∈ G
N is balanced if
for every balanced collection B it holds that∑
S∈B
λSv(S) ≤ v(N).
The Bondareva-Shapley theorem is the following.
Theorem 4.1 A TU-game v ∈ GN has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced.
The main result of this section states that for any normal form oligopoly game for which
every individual profit function is concave on the set of strategy profiles, the associated
oligopoly TU-game is balanced, and so admits a non-empty γ-core.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) be a normal form oligopoly game such that πi is
concave on XN for every i ∈ N . Then the associated oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N
o is
balanced and therefore has a non-empty γ-core.
In order to establish the proof of theorem 4.2, we first need the following lemma. Given a
normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ), a balanced family of coalitions B ⊆ P(N),
and every partial agreement equilibrium under S, (x∗S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S)) ∈ XN , such that
S ∈ B, define y ∈ XN a strategy profile as
∀i ∈ N, yi =
∑
S∈Bi
λSx
∗
S,i(z˜−S) (28)
Lemma 4.3 Let y ∈ XN be a strategy profile as in (28). Then
∀j ∈ N,
∑
S∈Bj
λSX
P,S ≥ Y
where Y =
∑
i∈N yi.
Proof: Pick any j ∈ N . First, we show that∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i 6∈S
z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i) ≥
∑
S∈B\Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S) (29)
By (ii) and (iv) of corollary 3.8, it follows that
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∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i 6∈S
z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i) ≥
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i 6∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)
=
∑
S∈Bj
λS
(∑
i∈N
z˜i(z˜−i)−
∑
i∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)
)
=
∑
i∈N
z˜i(z˜−i)−
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)
=
∑
S∈B
λS
∑
i∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)−
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)
=
∑
S∈B\Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
z˜i(z˜−i)
≥
∑
S∈B\Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S).
Thus, by (29) it holds that
∑
S∈Bj
λSX
P,S =
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S) +
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i 6∈S
z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i)
≥
∑
S∈Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S) +
∑
S∈B\Bj
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)
=
∑
S∈B
λS
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
λSx
∗
S,i(z˜−S)
= Y ,
which completes the proof. 
Helm (2001) obtains a similar result for games with multilateral environmental externali-
ties. Now, we are ready to establish the proof of theorem 4.2.
Proof: Let B ⊆ P(N) be a balanced family of coalitions and y ∈ XN be a strategy
profile as in (28). By the concavity of every individual profit function πi on XN , lemma
4.3 and the strict monotonicity of the inverse demand function, and the Pareto efficiency
of the worth of the grand coalition it holds that
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∑
S∈B
λSvγ(S) =
∑
S∈B
λS
∑
i∈S
πi(x
∗
S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S))
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Bi
λSπi(x
∗
S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S))
≤
∑
i∈N
πi
( ∑
S∈Bi
λS(x
∗
S(z˜−S), z˜−S(x
∗
S))
)
=
∑
i∈N
[
p
( ∑
S∈Bi
λSX
P,S
)
yi − Ci(yi)
]
≤ p(Y )Y −
∑
i∈N
Ci(yi)
≤ vγ(N),
which completes the proof. 
The concave condition in theorem 4.2 is a sufficient condition for γ-core existence, but
it is not a necessary condition. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.4
Consider the oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N
o associated with the oligopoly situation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p)
where N = {1, 2, 3}, w1 = 5, w2 = 1, w3 = 2, C1(x1) = x1, C2(x2) = 2x2,
C3(x3) = 2x3 and the inverse demand function is defined as p(X) = 10 − X. Clearly,
every individual profit function is not concave on XN . The worth of every coalition
S ∈ P(N) is given in the following table:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vγ(S) 9 2 4 12.25 16 5.44 20.25
We can easily check that σ = (13.25, 3, 4) is in the γ-core, and so the γ-core is non-
empty. 
5 A solution in the γ-core for oligopoly TU-games with
linear cost functions
Although the concave condition seems to be a natural requirement to guarantee the
non-emptiness of the γ-core, many oligopoly situations fail to satisfy it. For instance,
in a linear oligopoly situation, i.e. p(X) = a − X where a ∈ R++, and for all i ∈ N
Ci(xi) = cixi where ci ∈ R+, every individual profit function is quadratic but it is not
concave on XN as in example 4.4. In this section, we adopt an alternative approach
that consists in providing a solution in the γ-core without the concavity requirement. We
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succeed in doing that by assuming that cost functions are linear and that firms have
the same marginal cost, i.e.
∃c ∈ R+ s.t. ∀i ∈ N, Ci(xi) = cxi (30)
We do not impose any other conditions on the capacity constraints and the inverse demand
function. For a fixed set of players N , we denote by GN∗o the set of oligopoly TU-
games associated with an oligopoly situation (N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) satisfying (30).
A solution on GN∗o is a mapping ρ : G
N∗
o −→ R
n that associates to every oligopoly
TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o a payoff vector ρ(vγ) ∈ R
n. For notational convenience, given the
normal form oligopoly game (N, (Xi, πi)i∈N ) we denote by X
P,∅ =
∑
i∈N z˜i(z˜−i) the
total output on the Nash equilibrium. For any oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o consider
the solution, called the NP(Nash Pro rata)-value, defined as follows
∀i ∈ N, NPi(vγ) =
{
z˜i(z˜−i)
XP,∅
vγ(N) if X
P,∅ > 0
0 otherwise
(31)
The NP-value distributes to every player i ∈ N the worth of the grand coalition, vγ(N),
in proportion to his Nash individual output z˜i(z˜−i).
Theorem 5.1 For every oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o , it holds that NP(vγ) ∈ C(vγ).
Proof: First, pick any vγ ∈ G
N∗
o such that X
P,∅ = 0. By (i) of corollary 3.8, for every
S ∈ P(N) we have XP,S = 0, and so vγ(S) = 0. In this case, it is obvious that
NP(vγ) ∈ C(vγ).
Then, pick any vγ ∈ G
N∗
o such that X
P,∅ > 0. For the sake of contradiction assume
that NP(vγ) 6∈ C(vγ), i.e. there exists a deviating coalition S ∈ P(N) such that
vγ(S) >
∑
i∈S NPi(vγ). It follows that vγ(S) > 0 and so X
P,S > 0. Consider the payoff
vector σS ∈ R
n defined as
∀i ∈ N, σS,i =
vγ(N)
XP,S
αi
where
αi =
{
x∗S,i(z˜−S) if i ∈ S
z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i) if i 6∈ S
From (i) and (ii) of corollary 3.8, we know thatXP,S ≤ XP,∅ and z˜i(z˜−i) ≤ z˜i(x
∗
S , z˜−S∪i)
for all i 6∈ S respectively. This implies that σS,i(vγ) ≥ NPi(vγ) for all i 6∈ S. Moreover, by
the Pareto efficiency of the worth of the grand coalition and the contradicting assumption
it holds that
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∑
i∈S
σS,i(vγ) =
vγ(N)
XP,S
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)
≥
1
XP,S
(
p(XP,S)XP,S − cXP,S
)∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)
= p(XP,S)
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)− c
∑
i∈S
x∗S,i(z˜−S)
= vγ(S)
>
∑
i∈S
NPi(vγ).
Thus, we obtain
∑
i∈N σS,i(vγ) >
∑
i∈N NPi(vγ) and
∑
i∈N ρS,i(vγ) = vγ(N) =∑
i∈N NPi(vγ), a contradiction. 
Note that for large capacity constraints the NP-value is equal to the Equal Division
solution that distributes vγ(N) equally among the players since in this case z˜i(z˜−i) =
z˜j(z˜−j) for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j. Funaki and Yamato (1999) show that this latter value
belongs to the γ-core of their common pool game without capacity constraints. Since
their common pool game belongs to the class GN∗o , theorem 5.1 generalizes their result
from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Thus, on the class GN∗o ,
contrary to the Equal Division solution, the NP-value is a solution that always belongs to
the γ-core by taking into account players’ asymmetric capacity constraints.
From the regulator point of view it is interesting to know which properties are satisfied
by the NP-value. On the class GN∗o , the NP-value can be characterized by means of four
properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity and non-cooperative fairness. For every
oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o , we say that a solution ρ satisfies:
1. Efficiency: if
∑
i∈N ρi(vγ) = vγ(N) (EFF)
2. Null firm: if for all i ∈ N such that wi = 0, then ρi(vγ) = 0 (NF)
3. Monotonicity: if for all i, j ∈ N such that wi ≥ wj , then ρi(vγ) ≥ ρj(vγ) (M)
4. Non-cooperative fairness: if for all i, j ∈ N , vγ({j})ρi(vγ) = vγ({i})ρj(vγ)
(NCF)
Theorem 5.2 A solution ρ on GN∗o satisfies (EFF), (NF), (M) and (NCF) if and only if
ρ = NP.
Proof: Pick any vγ ∈ G
N∗
o . Firstly, we show that the NP-value satisfies (EFF). Assume
that XP,∅ = 0. It follows that NPi(vγ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Moreover, by (i) of corollary 3.8
we have XP,N = 0, and so
∑
i∈N NPi(vγ) = vγ(N) = 0. Then, assume that X
P,∅ > 0.
By (31) we solve directly that
∑
i∈N NPi(vγ) = vγ(N).
Secondly, we show that the NP-value satisfies (NF). Pick any i ∈ N such that wi = 0.
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Assume that XP,∅ = 0. By (31) we have NPi(vγ) = 0. Then, assume that X
P,∅ > 0.
Since wi = 0 it follows that z˜i(z˜−i) = 0, and so by (31) we have NPi(vγ) = 0.
Thirdly, we show that the NP-value satisfies (M). Pick any i, j ∈ N such that wj ≥ wi.
Assume that XP,∅ = 0. By (31) we have NPj(vγ) = NPi(vγ) = 0. Then, assume that
XP,∅ > 0. From wj ≥ wi and vγ ∈ G
N∗
o it follows that z˜j(z˜−j) ≥ z˜i(z˜−i), and so by
(31) we have NPj(vγ) ≥ NPi(vγ).
Fourthly, we show that the NP-value satisfies (NCF). Assume that XP,∅ = 0. It follows
that NPi(vγ) = 0 for all i ∈ N , and so vγ({j})NPi(vγ) = vγ({i})NPj(vγ) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N . Then, assume that XP,∅ > 0. For all i, j ∈ N it holds that
vγ({j})NPi(vγ) =
(
p(XP,∅)− c
)
z˜j(z˜−j)
z˜i(z˜−i)
XP,∅
vγ(N)
=
(
p(XP,∅)− c
)
z˜i(z˜−i)
z˜j(z˜−j)
XP,∅
vγ(N)
= vγ({i})NPj(vγ).
It remains to show that the NP-value is the unique solution on the class GN∗o that
satisfies (EFF), (NF), (M) and (NCF). Pick any solution ρ on GN∗o satisfying (EFF),
(NF), (M) and (NCF) and prove that it is equal to the NP-value. By (EFF), we know
that
∑
i∈N ρi(vγ) = vγ(N). Moreover, (NF) and (M) ensures that ρi(vγ) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N . Thus, there exists β : GN∗o −→ R
n
+ such that
∀i ∈ N, ρi(vγ) =
βi(vγ)∑
j∈N
βj(vγ)
vγ(N) (32)
Assume that XP,∅ = 0. By (i) of corollary 3.8 we have XP,N = 0, and so vγ(N) = 0. It
follows that ρi(vγ) = NPi(vγ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, assume that X
P,∅ > 0. Without
loss of generality, assume that
∑
i∈N βi(vγ) = X
P,∅. By (32) and (NCF) it follows that
∀i, j ∈ N, vγ({j})βi(vγ) = vγ({i})βj(vγ).
For every i ∈ N , by summing the equations above over all j ∈ N we obtain
∑
j∈N
vγ({j})βi(vγ) = vγ({i})
∑
j∈N
βj(vγ)⇐⇒
(
p(XP,∅)− c
)
XP,∅βi(vγ) =
(
p(XP,∅)− c
)
z˜i(z˜−i)X
P,∅
⇐⇒ βi(vγ) = z˜i(z˜−i).
Thus, we conclude that ρi(vγ) = NPi(vγ) for all i ∈ N . 
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One can ask whether oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form are super-
additive8 or convex.9 Norde et al. (2002) establish that oligopoly TU-games in β-
characteristic function form are convex in case the inverse demand function and cost
functions are linear. As the following example shows, this result can not be extended for
oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form.
Example 5.3
Consider the oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o associated with the oligopoly situation
(N, (wi, Ci)i∈N , p) where N = {1, 2, 3}, w1 = 3/2, w2 = 3, w3 = 5/2, Ci(xi) = 2xi
for all i ∈ N , and the inverse demand function is defined as p(X) = 10−X. The worth
of every coalition S ∈ P(N) is given in the following table:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vγ(S) 3.25 4.69 4.69 7.56 7.56 10.56 16
Thus, v({1, 2}) < v({1})+ v({2}). We conclude that the oligopoly TU-game vγ ∈ G
N∗
o
is neither superadditive nor convex. 
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have focused on oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form.
When a coalition forms, the underlying assumption is that external agents choose their
action individually as a best reply to the coalitional action (Chander and Tulkens 1997;
Helm 2001). For the class of oligopoly TU-games, this assumption seems more appro-
priate than the standard assumption for which those external agents act to minimize the
coalitional profit and used to define the β-characteristic function. Oligopoly TU-games
in β-characteristic function form were studied, among others, by Zhao (1999a,b), Norde
et al. (2002), Driessen and Meinhardt (2005). Unsurprisingly, the γ-core is included in
the β-core.
In order to verify that the γ-characteristic function is well-defined, we have proved that
an equilibrium under every coalition structure, and so every partial agreement equilibrium,
exists. We have studied the variations of equilibrium outputs of every coalition according
to the coarseness of the coalition structure in which it is embedded. We have showed that
total production equilibrium is decreasing with the coarseness of the coalition structure.
This result is explained by the mergers between coalitions that occurred. Conversely, the
other coalitions which do not merge increase their output.
Concerning the non-emptiness of the γ-core, we have first established that oligopoly TU-
games in γ-characteristic function form are balanced when the inverse demand function
8A TU-game v ∈ GN is superadditive if for every S, T ∈ P(N) such that S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
9A TU-game v ∈ GN is convex if for every S, T ∈ P(N) it holds that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) +
v(S ∩ T ).
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is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the
set of strategy profiles. As already discussed earlier, this result is a step forward beyond
Zhao’s theorem (1999b) for the class of oligopoly TU-games. However, many oligopoly
situations fail to satisfy the concavity condition. In particular, this is the case when firms
have linear cost functions. Thus, in case of the cost functions are linear and firms have
the same marginal cost, we have introduced a single-valued allocation rule, the NP-value,
that distributes to every player the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to his Nash
individual output. We have showed that this solution belongs to the γ-core. Insofar as
our oligopoly game also describes a common pool game, this result generalizes Funaki
and Yamato’s core existence result (1999) from no capacity constraint to asymmetric
capacity constraints. Moreover, we have provided an axiomatic characterization of the
NP-value by means of four natural properties.
van den Brink (2008) proposes an axiomatic characterization of a class of proportional
solutions with exogenous weights. Define ∆n = {λ ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i∈N λi = 1} the (n − 1)-
dimensional unit simplex. For every λ ∈ ∆n and every TU-game v ∈ GN a proportional
solution, ρλ(v), is defined as ρλi (v) =
(
λi/
∑
j∈N λj
)
v(N) for all i ∈ N . van den Brink
(2008) characterizes this class of proportional solutions with three axioms: efficiency,
collusion neutrality10 and linearity. We know that the NP-value is an efficient solution on
GN∗o . However, it fails to satisfy collusion neutrality and linearity. We have characterized
a proportional solution with endogenous weights (Nash individual outputs) for the partic-
ular class GN∗o . An axiomatic characterization of a proportional solution with endogenous
weights on the general class GN would be of the greatest interest.
Other alternative blocking rules can be considered. For instance, agents in N\S can
choose coalitional (rather than individual) best reply strategies. In this case, in order to
determine the worth of every coalition S ∈ P(N), the equilibrium under the coalition
structure P = {S,N\S} must be considered. However, Funaki and Yamato (1999) show
that the associated core of their common pool game is always empty for n ≥ 4 in case
of the cost functions are symmetric and linear. This result remains valid for our model.
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